



Towards Cleaner Air in Poland

Maturity (feasibility) of clean air public policy in Poland and pathways to strengthen it.

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To make progress in understanding, we must remain modest and allow that we do not know. Nothing is certain or proved beyond all doubt.

You investigate for curiosity, because it is unknown, not because you know the answer.

Prof. Richard Feynman
in *Pleasure of Finding Things Out*



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raising social and political awareness

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

Comprehensive public advocacy work should address all the steps of creating and delivering collectively valued public service or regulation. These steps include but are not limited to the rising public and political awareness of the importance of social and economic challenges ahead, supporting social dialogue focused on the identification of root causes of problems the society is facing, providing a public meaning and promoting solutions that solve identified problems and finally helping the implementation of sustainable public policy. This is a complex and dynamic process requiring an iterative approach.

The scope of the project described in this report concentrated on the first iteration aiming at inserting and amplifying clean air policies within the 2023 national election in Poland. To meet this objective and identify necessary pathways and processes, parallel policy work had to be initialised that involved diagnosing key policy problems, analysing root causes, mapping the gaps in building the state's capability, and finally looking for potential policy solutions. These four steps followed Harvard Kennedy's approach known as Problem-Driven Iterative Adaption (PDIA) applied by state administrations and stakeholders in many countries to solve complex policy problems.

In the opening study, the maturity level of the current clean air policy was examined. The study based on Harvard Kennedy's Policy Essential Questions gave evidence to the initial assessment that the policy implementation was at risk. It manifested in every analysed dimension, be it the policy purpose, the people behind it, the societal promise, the fit for the situation, and the implementation process. Since the advocacy plan should be evidence-based, key policy problems were identified in political, economic, social, technological, and legal dimensions. Four root causes were then mapped involving large scale of

transformation, its high complexity, high political risk behind, and low priority. For each cause, the pathways in the perspective of collective acceptance, state authorisation and ability to deliver policy results were identified. They included involving the energy transformation dimension in the clean air policy discussion, supporting inclusive societal consensus in that matter, educating society about solutions in this complex decision-making environment, and campaigning on clean air policy challenges and values. To support these courses of action, potential public policy entry points have been identified through public discussions, one-on-one meetings and analysing of available policy sources.

The project results are then two-fold. On one side, they resolve policy-related challenges by giving clear direction on how to proceed with policy work. On the other side, they serve as the roadmap for what to do in the domain of advocacy to support clean air policy maturing and implementation within the 2023 national election in Poland and beyond.

On top of that, four general recommendations for future actions have been formulated. They call for the operationalisation of high-level postulates, urge actions now, and stress the value of policy maturity monitoring and the principle of sharing good practices among countries.

STARTING POINT

The problem

Despite several years of tangible efforts of stakeholders and public policy centres pushing for greater focus on clean air, the buy-in of critical government members and the general political arena in Poland has not been secured. Indeed, some solutions focused on selected problems have been applied, however, they do not constitute a coherent and comprehensive public policy.

The cause

The source of this lack of structured solutions is the scale of the economic and social challenges facing the Polish economy, the energy sector in particular, and citizens. They lead to political objectives, which avoid changing the air quality status quo. The clean air-related public value remains underestimated in terms of accepting the value for society, legitimising and providing support and dedicating operational capacity to these goals. As a result, critical deficits in these three policy pillars do not allow for an effective clean-air public value creation.

The opportunity

The current political calendar creates conditions for a change in this approach. While the next parliamentary elections (to the lower house Sejm and Senate) will be held in autumn 2023, all parties and political forces that count on the Polish scene have entered into a period of preparation for the election campaign, the peak of which will fall in the spring-autumn 2023.

The forthcoming elections, therefore, provide a rare opportunity to raise awareness among both politicians and voters of the importance of reducing air pollution for life, health and well-being. However, to develop the most effective advocacy plan, one first needs to understand the landscape for advocacy and critical entryways for clean air policies.

This report supports the initial stages of a targeted advocacy effort by scoping the pathways that may help insert and amplify the need to tackle air pollution within Poland's 2023 national elections.

The changing landscape

The Russian aggression in Ukraine has changed the context in which any advocacy efforts should be implemented as it has created a difficult and crowded media and political space. Therefore, this report takes a careful approach, focusing on policy research, and advocacy planning while evaluating this changing context and identifying why clean air should be inserted in political discussions ahead of the national elections.

JOURNEY


Research Methodology

The approach applied in this report is based on decades of public policy work carried out at Harvard University – Harvard Kennedy School and other leading policy research centres. In particular, it grows out of Moore's Strategic Triangle¹, which teaches that the policy will succeed if three conditions are simultaneously fulfilled: the policy outcomes are collectively valued by everybody affected, the policy creation received all necessary support and legitimisation, and finally, those who are expected to deliver the public value are fully capable, which means they are prepared, focused and committed to work.

While this Strategic Triangle concept is logical and easy to embrace, what people don't fully realize is how demanding this simple concept turns out to be when one brings it to bear on a particular concrete challenge such as clean air. To overcome it, several operational tools were applied among which the problem-driven iterative approach constituted the governing framework.

Problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA)² is a logic-driven approach to complex policy problems developed by Harvard Kennedy's Center for International Development. Typically applied to problems in the development sector, the PDIA approach involves breaking down problems with a local team and identifying the gaps and opportunities for solutions. PDIA is the opposite of the so-called solution and leader-driven change approach (SLDC) where a fixed solution is applied to solve a problem through a well-developed and disciplined plan by an authorized and competent leader working with a small group of experts.

SLDC has been dominating policy work for decades however it proved to be successful in conditions that are predictable, remain under control, and where



political compromises do not erode the plan. This is a rare comfort in today's age. Looking at global warming, the energy sector crisis, economic and social tensions, and war conflicts such as the Russian aggression in Ukraine, one should be extremely cautious to address the clean air policy problem by applying the SLDC approach alone. Indeed, some public policies today constitute a combination of both SLDC and PDIA approaches. The proportion varies depending on the task and conditions. However, bearing in mind the complexity of the clean air challenge, the number and variety of stakeholders affected, and last but not least the political dynamics in the economic, social and state security context, it was assumed PDIA should be in the focus of this report.

During the course of work, the PDIA frame has been reinforced by some innovative and proven tools. Examples include Andrews' Essential Policy Questions to understand the chances of success for the current clean-air policy in Poland, PESTL to better embrace the opportunities and threads in the environment while identifying good policy problems, and finally, the Arena Screening, which is an original IZiD's approach to stakeholder mapping. It is also worth explaining the PDIA itself incorporates several recognised tools for example Toyoda 5Why, Ishikawa Fishbone Diagram or Andrews' AAA gap analysis tool. Each will be demonstrated when applied.



¹ Moore, M.H. Creating Public Value. Harvard University Press, 1997.

² Samji, S. Andrews, M. Pritchett, L. Woolcock, M. PDIA toolkit. A DIY Approach to Solving Complex Problems. Center for International Development at Harvard University, October 2018.



clean-air policy chances of success

STEP 0

Evaluating current clean-air policy chances of success

The method

To diagnose the current state of the clean air policy the Clean Air Movement Poland team (CAMP) answered Andrews' Essential Policy Questions³. The survey contains 25 questions about the maturity of public policy which is assessed along five dimensions:

1. Is the policy purpose established?
2. Are needed policy people identified and engaged in the work?
3. Is the policy promise (solution and results commitment) clear and deliverable?
4. Is the work fitted to the policy place, people, preparedness, and period?
5. Is there a policy process in place to foster effective implementation?

The results provided indications about what are the chances of success of the clean air policy at this time. This was possible thanks to the scale on which answers were given. The scale named after its author Andrews' Public Policymaking 'Unknowns' Framework (APPUF) describes the degree of unknown. The more profound and more frequent the unknown is, the less the policy is likely to achieve its objective. Andrews identified seven degrees of the unknown:

- 0th → Full certainty
- 1st → Quantifiable risk
- 2nd → Strict uncertainty
- 3rd → Recognised ignorance
- 4th → Ambiguity
- 5th → Indeterminacy
- 6th → Total ignorance

This created a map of areas of certainty and uncertainty, which indicated issues that require increased attention in the clean air policy in Poland. The results are shown in fig. 1 to 6.

The observations

The first thing that should be observed when analysing the answers is their varied characteristics depending on the dimension. For example, when looking closer at the involvement of the necessary persons responsible for policy (question group 2), the participants' answers focused on a high area of uncertainty characterized by ambiguity, while in the case of the possibility of fulfilling a political promise (questions group 3), there was a lack of agreement among the participants of the study and the answers were scattered from complete certainty to complete ignorance. The roots of such extreme and opposite views should be understood.

The second observation concerns the number of negative and extremely negative judgements expressed by uncertainty and complete ignorance. Their share was 17% of all responses (39/225). This is a significant figure illustrating the high level of uncertainty that characterises the implementation of the clean air policy. In other words, it represents an early warning that the policy may fail if it is not adjusted or supported.



³ Andrews, M. Getting Real about Unknowns in Complex Policy Work. RISE Working Paper 21/083, November 2021.




Figure 1.
Is the clean air policy purpose established?

- Is the problem considered manageable (with identifiable, agreed and treatable causes and interactions)?
- Are the potential winners and losers of this policy work clearly identified, accepted and being managed?
- Are the values and interests informing policy work clear, accepted and non-conflictual?
- Is the motivational problem receiving active attention and included in relevant policy agenda(s)?
- Is the clean air policy motivated by an agreed, clear and consequential public problem?




Figure 3.
Is the policy promise (solution and results commitment) clear and deliverable?

- Are risk of non-delivery of milestones and deliverables clear and manageable?
- Are there clear and agreed periodic milestones and deliverables associated with this response?
- Is there clear and agreed response to the problem (ideas that will solve the problem)?
- Are there clear, agreed metrics to signal the state of the world will look like when the problem is 'solved'?
- Is there a clear and agreed vision of what the state of the world will look like when the problem is "solved"?




Figure 2.
Are needed policy people identified and engaged in the work?

- Are processes in place to manage competing interests, opposition and resistance to the policy work?
- Are appropriate discourse processes actively fostering needed interaction between agents?
- Are public beneficiaries and other affected public parties actively engaged with (and committed to) the work?
- Are appropriately skilled implementers actively engaged in (and committed to) the policy work?
- Are appropriately skilled planners and designers actively engaged in (and committed to) the policy work?
- Are political, resource and administrative authorizers actively engaged in (and committed to) the work?




Figure 4.
Is the work fitted to the policy place, people, preparedness, and period?

- Is the policy work actively fitted to the 'period' of engagement (the time and timing of action)?
- Is the policy work actively fitted to realities of contextual 'preparedness' (especially existing capacity)?
- Is the policy work actively fitted to story of the 'people' affected (especially history and culture)?
- Is the policy work actively fitted to realities of the 'place' of engagement (especially laws, geography, politics)?




Figure 5.
Is there a policy process in place to foster effective implementation?

- Are decisions needed to execute programmed actions occurring as and when required (or likely to be)?
- Are resources (including finances) being (or likely to be) effectively mobilized to execute programmed actions?
- Are agents being (or likely to be) effectively mobilized to execute programmed actions?
- Is the program being (or likely to be) actively 'carried out' - turned from intent action?
- Is there a clear and agreed program of action to deliver the proposed policy response?




Figure 6.
Maturity of clean air public policy (in total)

The conclusions

The third observation focuses on the aggregated outcome of the study. Most judgements were formulated at the level of ambiguity and recognised ignorance of policymakers. This is the danger zone. While in case of recognised ignorance there is a chance that they can be identified if the focus is on, in case of ambiguity it is a call for in-depth reflection on the reasons for such assessment and possible remedial actions.

Looking at the identified maturity level of the clean air policy one can easily conclude its implementation is currently at risk. External conditions shaped by the changing landscape in politics, state security, energy, and economics have impaired the state's capability to implement the policy. It manifests in every analysed dimension, be it the policy purpose, the people behind it, the societal promise, the fit for the situation, and the implementation process.

Considering the answers to the Essential Policy Questions, the clean air advocacy plan should therefore address the following high-level objectives:

1. Help align clean air policy objectives with realities and ambitions, manage expectations and seize opportunities.
2. Support identification of all the beneficiaries and obligatees of the policy.
3. Assist in building relations between policy supporters and opponents to manage conflicts of interest and resistance to change.
4. Highlight activities that support the selection and involvement of the necessary people responsible for creating, legitimising, and implementing the clean air policy.
5. Provide broad information on policy developments so that everybody is informed and on the same page.

To carry out the task as described requires us to go through the core steps below of the PDIA framework.

STEP 1

Constructing the problem

The focus must be on the problem, not on the solution

Based on the observation of Harvard's Center for International Development, the key pitfall to be avoided in policy work is to focus on the problem rather than on the known solution. This is because know solutions represent existing practices which do not necessarily address a specific root cause in place. If the solution applied in policy work does not resolve the origin of the problem, then there is a substantial risk that policy outcomes would be unsatisfactory or only partially satisfactory.

As has been demonstrated by Andrews⁴ the results of 999 projects undertaken with \$60 billion in funding from the World Bank in over 100 countries between 2016 and 2020 are mixed. In this number, only 295 policy engagements brought satisfactory or highly satisfactory results, 105 were highly unsatisfactory or just unsatisfactory, while the remaining 599 were considered moderately satisfactory or unsatisfactory. As if that wasn't enough, Andrews has shown that in the case of 477 projects, i.e., in almost half the cases, the chances that outputs and outcomes would be sustained, and impact would be achieved were at high or significant risk. Public funds are too valuable for such poor results to satisfy taxpayers and donors.

For many governments to admit a policy failure is highly unacceptable. That is why they tend to present even moderately satisfactory results as a success. One should remember that such projects bring a good number of outputs indeed but in terms of outcomes only some are achieved, with varying levels of relevance and efficiency.

Let's take an example of investments in healthcare infrastructure in Poland supported by EU structural funds. A prevailing majority of such projects focus on building a new

facility to "improve access and quality of care". Expected project outcomes such as achieving a predefined waiting time for specific procedures or risk-adjusted mortality levels are non-existent. The same can be observed in other public policy areas, in clean air policy in particular. Mild project end-points, safe objectives, focus on improvement, increase, reduction or any other unspecific goal not changing the status quo are prevailing.

"The Polish public administration is aware of state capability limitations. It is therefore not surprising that it prefers leaving space for error, non-performance, or force majeure. Although it can be to some extent explained in turbulent times of change, public policy solutions should be designed with the ambitious and inspiring objective in mind which is solving the identified "good problems".



The good problems

Until now we have explained the reasons for identifying good problems the clean air policy should address. Good problems are those that motivate and drive change because they matter to key change agents. For this research, the good problems are those that are preventing political action on air pollution. Understanding what those are, will make it possible to identify where opportunities exist to insert air pollution into the political sphere.

In the PDIA approach, good problems are identified during expert groups discussion around the following series of questions:

1.
What is the problem?

2.
Why does it matter? (Asked threefold)

3.
To whom does it matter?

4.
Who needs to care more?

5.
How do we get them to give it more attention?
(How do we measure it or tell stories about it)

6.
What will the problem look like when it is solved?

⁴ Andrews, M. Successful Failure in Public Policy Work. Andrews, M; and the President and Fellows of Harvard College. CID Faculty Working Paper No. 402, December 2021.

Due to the complexity of the clean air challenge, it was decided that the questions above should be answered separately in five PESTL dimensions, which address political (P), economical (E), social (S), technological (T) and legal (L) contexts.

During this exercise, the CAMP group came up with the following propositions of problems to be considered.

Political dimension:

- Lack of interest of politicians in the topic of clean air, and other problems is a priority for politicians – air pollution is not a topic for politicians.
- Lack of political leaders to take up this topic (both on the governing and the opposition side).
- Lack of a discussion partner.
- Lack of one coherent narrative, or vision.
- Blurred accountability at different levels of government.
- Fleeting attentiveness of politicians – smog lasts „only” six months.
- Politicians do not see it as an issue that could influence voters’ political decisions; the issue for voters is important declaratively, but not necessarily “electorally”.

Social dimension:

- The belief of citizens is that the cheapest method of heating is the one that pollutes the air the most.
- We affect many voters with this policy, millions of people (non-normative heating furnaces, cars, etc.).
- A dilemma what is stronger, resistance or willingness to change?
- Air pollution is in sixth place on the list of citizens’ priorities (only 5% indicated that it is a top problem).
- Changing the way of commuting by several million people.
- Lack of vision of what the world could look like after the transformation.
- The belief is that pollution has been “always” and you don’t need to do anything about it.

- The tradition of using energy from solid fuels.
- A different problem in rural areas (large access to forests), whereas different in large cities (heating networks) and different in small towns.

Technological dimension:

- Lack of professional support from the state administration, what people should do, each in their individual situation (personalised advice services).
- The complicated decision for people, complicated topics, and lack of knowledge of technology.
- Many heating technologies are currently unavailable for purchase or have long waiting times for delivery (heat pumps).
- Difficult availability of pellets (quality, price, physical availability).
- Problems with connecting to the gas network.
- A very bad technical condition of 30 per cent of single-family buildings.
- The chicken and egg problem – there is no demand because there are no products because there is no demand.

Legal perspective:

- Lack of legislative courage.
- Problem with the introduction of a legal obligation.
- No political order.
- Lack of policy enforcement tools.
- Local government will not penalise its voters.
- The poor ratio of punishment to reward.



As a result of further desk research and consultations to synthesise the above observations and put them in order the following good problems have been adopted for further PDIA elaborations:

Clean air policy good problems

Political perspective

- not a topic
- political leaders not interested
- not electorally weighting
- lack of one vision, narrative
- blurred accountability

Economical perspective

- affordable, but other priorities prevail
- change required in millions of homes
- the unknown future financial impact
- the high initial cost of transition
- the overly complex system of subsidies and incentives

Societal perspective

- polluting but the cheapest way of heating
- pollution has been around „forever”
- air pollution is in sixth place on the list of citizens’ priorities
- the tradition of using energy from solid fuels
- a change in commuting habits for millions of people

Technological perspective

- lack of professional support as to what people should do
- the complexity, lack of knowledge of the technology
- unavailable or long delivery times
- problems with connection to the gas grid
- poor technical condition of 30% of single-family buildings

Legal perspective

- problem with introducing a legal obligation
- lack of political mandate, lack of courage
- lack of enforcement
- local government will not punish its constituents
- the ratio of punishment to reward

STEP 2

Deconstructing the problem



Why does it happen

After constructing good problems, it is now time to deconstruct them using Root Cause Analysis (RCA). RCA reveals the relationship between different variables and possible causes. This should help us understand what causes the problems that hinder air pollution's entry into the political sphere.

For this purpose, PDIA recommends applying the Toyota 5Why approach, which is a proven method to identify the root causes. Conventionally speaking, it consists of repeating the question "Why does it happen" for each identified problem so long as it is necessary to pinpoint the true cause. The five is just a good estimate of how many times it is usually needed to repeat it.

A good way to understand the power of the 5Why approach is to follow the original Toyoda's example. Sakishi Toyoda was a Japanese inventor and industrialist, the father of the Japanese industrial revolution and the founder of Toyota Industries. His conversation with a plant employee about a specific problem with the production line went down in history. The conversation could have gone as follows:

- Why are you dumping sawdust on the floor? Sakishi Toyoda asked the employee.
- Because there is oil spilt on it. The employee replied.
- Why is the oil spilt? Toyoda continued asking.
- Because we have a leak from the piping system.
- And why is the pipework leaking?
- Because we are behind the schedule on its technical inspection.
- Will you explain why?
- Unfortunately, the maintenance contract has expired.
- Then why are you dumping sawdust on the floor...?!


The answer why

When the 5Why was applied to good problems relating to clean air policy, the following four final root causes were identified.

Root causes of the complex problems in clean air policy

- Large scale
- High complexity
- High political risk
- Low priority

The structured outcome of the performed 5Why analysis was then presented on the Ishikawa fishbone diagram below.



This diagram will serve as the navigation map for the identification of the change space to find entry points supporting the reinforcement of clean air policy through the advocacy plan.

STEP 3 Sequencing

Method

The third step of PDIA focuses on examining the change space to find entry points helping to resolve the problem described in the fishbone diagram in step 2. It consists of performing a so-called Triple-A check identifying the magnitude and specifics of the enabling space. Triple-A stands for Authority, Acceptance and Ability and is aimed to deal with the root causes. During this process, the size and character of gaps for each root cause are identified and analysed. The goal is to uncover the change space to increase air pollution's importance politically so that it can be addressed with a corresponding public policy.

Acceptance relates to the extent to which those who will be affected by the clean air policy accept the public value of clean air. Both beneficiaries of the policy and the obligatees must collectively value the need for change and the implications of change. Different types of change require different levels of acceptance (from narrow or broad groups and at different depths) and the key is to recognize what acceptance exists and what gaps need to be closed to foster change. Implementing a policy in the absence of general acceptance mobilises its opponents and usually weakens or delays policy outcomes.

Authority refers to the legitimacy and support needed for clean air policy in the context of the state's capability to implement it. Authority could be political, legal, organizational, or personal. Some change needs more authority than other changes, and it is important to assess the extent of authority clean air policy already has. It also enables identifying the authority gaps that need to be closed.

Ability focuses on the practical side of the clean air policy implementation process. It addresses the operational capabilities of the policy-implementing bodies and people in the context of time, money, skills and people's willingness to even start any kind of intervention. It is important to ask what abilities exist and what gaps need to be closed.

Findings

The following Venn diagrams were proposed describing the policy implementation gaps and the change space or need (figure 8). Four related recommendations making use of the identified change space were formulated during a dedicated workshop of CAMP team as described below.



Figure 8. Venn diagrams of the policy change space and gaps

Starting with the high-risk root cause it was concluded that the political and economic risks related to the implementation of the clean air public policy lack the most state authority and support. It is interesting to find that public administration's acceptance of policy values is high while the ability to deliver the results matches to some extent the policy ambitions. Nevertheless, without adequate authorisation, the policy cannot be implemented.

Based on the CAMP Triple-A workshop FIRST recommendations, the high-risk political and economic perception can be mitigated by involving the energy transformation dimension in the clean air policy discussion. It would match high-level political objectives including national energetical safety, and protection of family finance with lower energy bills. Here, the state's readiness to authorise required activities and provide support to households is high. The way, election-year resistance to high-risk actions could turn into a politically attractive offer addressing the needs of the electorate.

A different situation was observed from the large-scale policy perspective. The scale of the challenges seems to overwhelm both state institutions, critical infrastructure operators and the public. Vis-à-vis these barriers, the basic acceptance of the policy objectives is degraded to such a level that the policy implementation is delayed or narrowed. As the result, even with high determination from authorising officers to deploy some actions and partial ability to deliver results, the policy is failing.

Per CAMP SECOND recommendation, this should be overcome from two sides. First, people should feel they are the owners of clean air targets. Enforcing climate and air targets by the state without broad social participation will fail. Objectives and the role of clean air should be worked out by people from the bottom up. Social dialogue supporting and stimulating activities on a large scale are needed. When the societal consensus is reached, economic and energy arguments should be employed. In the individual dimension, it means people should understand that heating a house with low-quality furnaces is the most costly way. In the public dimension, the state should explain the high costs of the provision of health care services related to diseases caused by air pollution. The latter should be supported by a campaign by general practitioners on the health impact of air pollution. This way, the desired large-scale acceptance of change may be achieved.

Now, assuming even a positive scenario that high-risk and large-scale challenges would be mitigated it appears that people are confused with the high complexity of solutions. Those who present high acceptance to undergo a difficult process of change face a lack of support in making informed and smart decisions. The support they receive is limited to financial instruments with next to nothing professional advice from the administration on what solution to choose, how to implement it, and how to resolve infrastructure problems. As the result, their ability to join the policy efforts is substantially limited.

The CAMP THIRD recommendation is based on the observation that policy measures are focused on isolated spots rather than demonstrating a systematic approach. There is no understanding of how complex decisions must be taken by households and no appreciation of the public's expenditure in different areas by those who had the determination to take on the challenge. Rewarding integrated actions and educating society about solutions in this complex decision-making environment would substantially increase people's ability to implement the clean air policy.

Finally, considering that some support from the policymakers is provided, decreased acceptance and even lower ability to execute policy change prevail. The result is the low priority of policy actions, which keep waiting in the queue behind immediate needs.

*Following the **FOURTH** CAMP recommendation, people's clean air policy awareness is low. There are no shortcuts – there must be a comprehensive country-wide and sustainable information campaign in place on clean air policy challenges, values and solutions. This campaign should be coordinated with policy actions. As a matter of example, it is not sustainable to accept a low tax on large SUV cars while enforcing clean air policies in other public living areas. This attitude does not help people to embrace the scale and complexity of the problem. Such a campaign would increase people's ability to adopt the clean air policy while the state would feel more confident about authorising necessary policy actions.*

The four CAMP recommendations addressing the state capability gaps in the change space represent a consistent set of directions on how to deploy a sustainable clean air policy.

STEP 4 | Crawling the design space

The method

The purpose of this PDIA step is to identify clean air maturity pathways by crawling the design space for possible solutions among existing practices, latent practices, positive deviance and external best practice. In the PDIA those four types of solutions are explained as follows⁵:

A. Existing practice

There is always some existing practice or capability which provides an opportunity, to learn about what works in your context, what does not work, and why. Common tools to help in this process include gap analysis, program evaluation, site visits, immersions and inspections etc. It is the practice that agents in your context know best and starting from where they are is a potentially empowering way of ensuring that these agents develop a clear view of the problem and provides local ownership of the find and fit process.

B. Latent Practice

This is the set of potential ideas and government capabilities that are possible in the context – given administrative and political realities – but require some focused attention to emerge. Rapid results type interventions where groups of people are given a challenge to solve a focal problem in a defined period with no new resources is an example. These can be incredibly motivating and empowering for local agents who get to see their own achievements in short periods. Ideas that emerge from these rapid initiatives can also become the basis of permanent solutions to existing problems.

C. Positive deviance

It relates to ideas that are already being acted upon in the changing context (they are thus possible), and that yield positive results (solving

the problem, and thus being technically correct), but are not the norm (hence the idea of deviance). Finding these positive deviants, celebrating them, codifying them and broadly diffusing the core principles of their success is crucial.

D. External best practice

It is often the first set of ideas reformers and policymakers look at and suggest. There are often multiple external good/best practice ideas to learn from and the find and fit process should start by identifying a few of these – rather than settling for one prematurely. Then, these ideas need to be translated into your own context.

To identify possible solutions, the voice of external experts, business leaders, scientists, politicians and government representatives was collected. Individual conversations and public discussions in Warsaw political space as well as during the Economic Forum in Karpacz (September 2022) and the Economic Forum of New Ideas in Sopot (October 2022) confirmed CAMP observations regarding the problems and causes of the lack of state capability to implement clean policy.

As a result of these considerations, the following solutions were formulated and categorised.



⁵ Samji, S. Andrews, M. Pritchett, L. Woolcock. M. PDIAtoolkit. Harvard Center for International Development, 2018.

The solutions

1. On the energy transformation roadmap:

The key problem is the lack of a roadmap and the lack of political consent for 20-30 years for Poland's energy transformation. The preparation of such a map should be a priority activity. It should consider the financial potential of the business (which must pay off) on one side and the needs of citizens on the other one.

Solution type: **(D) External best practice**

2. On buying preferences:

Society and industry should not be expected to switch to technologies with less environmental impact on their own. It simply must pay off for people and businesses. The key to the fight for the environment lies in the economy.

Solution type: **(D) External best practice**

3. On the European Green Deal:

When a house is on fire, we do not think about its architecture (read – this is not the time for a green economy). The political perspective requires defending the economic security of citizens in the first place, not the environment. The introduction of new technologies cannot lead to the bankruptcy of citizens. The human being is the most important element. The system should be transformed but at the right pace. In the discussion on the European Green Deal, it is important to look at new heating technologies developed in the circular economy. Investments in infrastructure are crucial – in transmission networks, in smart meters.

Solution type: **(A) Existing practice**

4. On the national growth priorities and pathways:

The gap in green finance must be filled by private enterprises. The potential of Polish research centres in the development of green technologies should be used. As part of the green transformation, Poland must make a technological leap also based on its own

technologies to catch up with the leaders. At the same time, co-creation should be developed, citizens should be involved, inequalities should be eliminated, and everyone should be given a chance to participate in the energy transformation, bearing in mind, however, that due to inflation their financial potential will weaken. Hence the particular role of business.

Solution type: **(B) Latent practice**

5. On the circular economy:


We should treat waste as a resource, not as a problem. Burning waste creates green energy if done properly. The challenge is which part of the waste should be used for raw materials and which for energy. There are examples of good practice. In Lafarge cementing plants in Poland, 80 per cent of heating energy comes from waste. The company is building a biogas plant, it focuses on energy from photovoltaic cells, it recovers heat from furnaces. But it is not yet using CO₂ in the CCS model (Carbon Capture and Storage) for the food industry. Why? Because there is no such cooperation today. It shows the scale of what can be achieved in Poland under the reduce, reuse, recover principle.

Solution type: **(C) Positive deviance**

6. On the further contribution from business:

A real game-changer can be private enterprises that have financial and organizational potential and are ready to invest in ECO technologies. However, doing so must simply pay off. Appropriate supporting public policies should be created for this purpose.

Solution type: **(C) Positive deviance**



lack of roadmap and political consensus



7. On the further contribution from people:

The ability of citizens to participate in the energy transition through, for example, investments in individual RES installations, replacement of heat sources or acceptance of a higher price of energy, which has a growing share of RES in its mix, will decrease due to inflation and depletion of people's purchasing potential. The solution to breaking this trend is to include in the transformation households that have so far been excluded, e.g. those that do not have the ability to install effective heat sources or install photovoltaic installations (energy communities, residents of blocks of flats). To this end, virtual and group prosumers should be supported.

Solution type: **(D) External best practice**

8. On energy poverty of people:

The scale of energy poverty is greater than previously estimated. A group of people who cannot afford energy media for years has been underestimated. The error that underestimated the measurement resulted from a faulty poverty estimation methodology. Moreover, energy poverty will increase. Knowledge about its actual scale should be used to create adequate public policies. The revealed structural problems require a longer time to be resolved.

Solution type: **(D) External best practice**

9. On future energy sources:

We are dealing with extremely divergent opinions of experts on energy policy. There is no unified vision of the state in this regard. The political context is ubiquitous. Questions about uranium mining in Poland for the needs of its nuclear power industry remain unanswered. Lack of a pragmatic view on hydrogen policy - a lot of promises, and hopes, but technological problems at this stage are far from being solved and without a clear projection for the future.

Solution type: **(B) Latent practice**


A good summary of this narrative is the conclusion Bill Gates formulated for Bloomberg on Sept. 21, 2022:

I don't think it's realistic to say that people are utterly going to change their lifestyle because of concerns about climate. The only real solution is to innovate better and cheaper alternatives.

The clean-air design space

The design space is defined in two dimensions. The horizontal dimension reflects on whether a potential solution to the problem is administratively and politically possible in the targeted context. The vertical dimension describes to what extent the proposed solution already proved or is capable to be technically effective in solving the problem being considered.

The following graph visualises the design space and the proposed solutions described in the former section.



The choice of solutions should be further discussed with experts and politicians.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS



Recommendation 1.

Operationalise!

Prepare a clean air operational plan for the first 100 days of a new government, providing directions for implementation of the clean air policy in the dimension of emerging wintertime, air pollution, high energy bills, the resilience of the healthcare system and other aspects.

High-level policy considerations at the end of the day must convert into meaningful actions changing the status quo. Whichever political constellation wins the election in Poland, will have to deliver its promises. Even if it did not promise much neglecting the impact of clean air on people's lives, it will have to face old problems strengthened as never before. The first 100 days of government are always critical. Due to last years' living in crisis, the public will expect from the government responsible actions as never before in the recent history of Poland.

Preparing and handing over to the future minister responsible for clean air such an operation plan could serve as a solid pathway to the implementation of the clean air policy after the election.

Recommendation 2.

The time to act is now.

Changing landscape is the call for action. The time to act is now. The next six months will be crucial in preparing the ground for clean air action for the new coalition and government.

The conditions are changing, indeed. Some people may ask if this should not be the reason for the transition of the advocacy plan and other activities. We understand the concern, but we also understand the practical meaning of uncertainty in doing policy work. That is exactly why we have applied Harvard Kennedy's Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation approach to address clean air policy challenges. Based on over two decades of experience in public policy, the deviation in state security, political, economic, and social status quo provides a strong justification to intervene to secure the space for successful and effective future policy activities.

It is also worth noting that despite external pressure, Poland did not lose its democratic backbone. The public administration passes the life stress test of operating under loss of continuity of external conditions and successfully adapts the state to the new situation. So should the clean air policy-related activities too. The more the policy environment dynamic is, the more the policy future is dependent on smart, adaptively tailored, continuous and sustainable advocacy. This conclusion applies to the coming 2023 parliamentary election period in particular.

Recommendation 3.

Monitor the clean air policy maturity. Compare countries' and regions' performance.

Public policy maturity changes over time. The level of its maturity corresponds to its chances of success. Monitoring provides evidence about the impact of the measures taken to date and real-life evidence for further activities.

At the beginning of the project, the policy maturity test did not pass very well for Poland. The responses to Harvard Kennedy's Policy Essential Questions recognised multiple areas of high-risk reaching levels of uncertainty as high as ignorance, ambiguity and indeterminacy on the unknown ladder. The structured work over the project time provided directions on decreasing these levels. Once applied, the impact should be measured periodically, twice a year. That would indicate where the policy is at a given moment and where it is aiming in terms of its probability of success. The policy maturity test should be practised and repeated to maintain continuity that should serve as a basis for comparing data and opinions and, above all, adopting the best narrative in the election campaign or future changes in the landscape.

Moreover, such measurements could be performed in different countries or even in the same country but in different regions or cities when regional clean air solutions are being applied. That would enable monitoring the policy implementation progress and comparing countries' and regions' performance. Naturally, it would provide a strong indication of where more effort is needed, and which activities brought the most efficient results. The study could be extended to other countries such as Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and South Africa. There is no cultural limitation to the applied Harvard Kennedy's methodology. This could be of enormous value to the Clean Air Fund and the effectiveness of its project implementations worldwide.

Recommendation 4.


Collect good practices. Share and learn by examples.

Understanding the reasons of policy success and failure is rudimental in creating public value. Different countries, different regions and cities might use nuanced tools that bring entirely different outcomes. Mapping in that measure of different practices and identifying the best and the worst performing practices is invaluable.

Performing policy maturity tests as described in Recommendation 3 should be applied to provide evidence-based project evaluation data on a quasi-continuous base. The results linked to policy-supporting activities would serve as a reliable indicator of good practices. Such practices should be then shared in the spirit of learning culture between different teams and different countries. Analogically, activities presenting poorer results should be corrected or discontinued.

We believe that building such a good practice sharing-and-learning environment would substantially promote the efficient use of budgets and resources. It would also allow Clean Air Fund to recognise the best teams and also support those valuable ones requiring assistance and guidance.





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